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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Agency fiduciary law encompasses the doctrine of corporate 
opportunity. The fiduciary duties a key employee owes his 
corporate employer is an area of law in transformation. In that 
transformation, the reasonable expectations of the parties in a 
corporate-fiduciary relationship are decisive in determining 
whether a key employee has breached any fiduciary duty owed his 
corporate employer. If a business opportunity is presented to a 
key employee, that employee cannot seize the opportunity for 
himself if: (a) the corporation is financially able to undertake 
it; (b) it is within the corporation's line of business, or (c) 
the corporation is interested in the opportunity. 
In this case, Williams and Rockwood were key employees of 
Gillham. While working for Gillham, they took preparatory steps 
which culminated in exploiting Gillham's 10-year, lucrative 
advertising account with KSL. Those preparatory steps and 
seizing the KSL account were in breach of Williams' and Rock-
wood's duties to Gillham of (1) good faith, loyalty, and fair 
dealing; (2) to disclose information relevant to the KSL account 
entrusted to Williams and Rockwood; and (3) not to put themselves 
in a position antagonistic to Gillham concerning the KSL account. 
The issue of whether Williams and Rockwood were "key 
employees" or merely "ordinary employees" precluded the trial 
court from granting summary judgment in favor of Williams and 
Rockwood. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER DEVELOPING CASE LAW, WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD, AS 
KEY EMPLOYEES, BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO 
GILLHAM. 
The fiduciary duties a key employee owes his corporate 
employer is a developing area of law. A few exceptional cases 
have recognized the competing interests of the corporation, the 
individuals, and society that arise when key employees pursue 
business opportunities that the corporation claims belong to it. 
Those cases, and scholarly analysis of them, provide a framework 
for determining in this case whether Williams and Rockwood, as 
key employees, breached their fiduciary duties to Gillham. 
In Competing Interests in The Corporate Opportunity Doc-
trine, 67 N. Carolina L. Rev. 435 (1989), Pat K. Chew, Assistant 
Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, argues 
that the corporate opportunity doctrine should acknowledge and 
protect legitimate individual and societal interests, as well as 
legitimate corporate interests. Second, Professor Chew argues 
that corporate opportunity disputes should be resolved in ways 
2 
that are consistent with the reasonable expectations of both the 
corporation and the fiduciaries. 67 N. Carolina L. Rev. at p. 
439. 
Professor Chew conducted a comprehensive review of corporate 
opportunity cases reported between April 1977 and April 1988. 
Her analysis revealed that these disputes usually occur in close 
corporations in a wide range of industries. 
. The defendants are traditional corporate 
fiduciaries such as directors and officers, or, as is 
occurring more frequently, the defendants are non-
traditional fiduciaries such as key employees. The 
opportunities these individuals pursue are often 
directly competitive to the corporation . . . . 
Ibid., pp. 436-437, fn. 2. 
Professor Chew offers a solution that accommodates both 
legitimate corporate and non-corporate interests. She proposes* 
that future disputes be resolved according to the expectations of 
both the corporation and the fiduciaries. In the optimal 
situation, the parties will have an express agreement on how they 
expect to resolve corporate opportunity disputes. In the absence 
of an agreement, the courts should determine what their reason-
able expectations would have been. Ibid., p. 436. 
Professor Chew identifies two corporate interests: (1) 
maintaining the integrity of the relationship between the 
fiduciaries and the corporation, and (2) avoiding the direct 
economic harm incurred when the corporation is deprived of an 
opportunity. Ibid., p. 441. 
Professor Chew recognizes the necessity to maintain the 
integrity of the fiduciary-corporate relationship: 
3 
Corporate fiduciaries are in positions of trust. 
In order to fulfill their general responsibilities and 
make key decisions, they must have access to extensive 
and confidential information. They also have signifi-
cant decision making authority to direct and implement 
major corporate policies. As representatives of the 
corporation, they are in contact with individuals and 
entities, including suppliers, distributors, and 
customers, that serve the corporations1 operational 
needs. Because of their corporate positions and 
activities, fiduciaries are exposed to opportunities of 
interest to the corporation and of possible personal 
interest to themselves. 
The corporation relies on fiduciaries to fulfill 
their duties in good faith and with integrity. The 
corporation provides them with access to information 
and contacts so that the fiduciaries can perform 
effectively, not so that they can exploit these 
resources for their own personal benefit. Although 
individuals assume fiduciary roles to serve their 
personal and professional objectives as well as the 
corporation's needs, the corporation is concerned that 
these personal interests may conflict with corporate 
interests—that fiduciaries will allow their personal 
interests to overcome their corporate loyalty and will 
betray the corporation's trust. The corporation does 
not want to have to speculate about or monitor the 
fiduciaries' honesty and fair-dealing. It wants 
assurance that when the fiduciaries make corporate 
decisions, those decisions are not tainted by personal 
interests. 
Ibid., p. 442. She characterizes the typical fact pattern: 
In the typical fact pattern the fiduciaries 
identify, investigate, negotiate, decide to pursue, and 
make preliminary plans for the opportunity. They then 
resign their fiduciary roles, actively begin a compet-
ing business, and ultimately develop the opportunity 
into a profitable venture. The fiduciaries usually 
have not signed non-competition agreements. 
Ibid . , p. 444. (Footnote omitted.) She acknowledges the 
negative consequences fiduciaries have suffered as the result of 
taking only preparatory steps while still employed by the 
corporation: 
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Moreover 'jarts nave assumed implicitly that 
fiduciaries ••-.-/ haive breached their duty even though 
only preparatory steps to start the business were taken 
during the fiduciaries' tenure,, it those preparatory 
steps culminate exploitation at the opportunity. 
[ Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter , 14 Mass . App . C t . 
296," 4 38 N.E. 2d 391 (1982); Klinicki v. LundgrVn, 298 
Or. 662, 695 P. 2d 906 . l.-#55) (en banc;; Nicholson v. 
Evans , 642 P. 2d 727 (Utah 1982).; Prohibiting the 
fiduciaries' active competition against the corporation 
during their tenure is consistent with basic principles 
of the duty of loyalty. r H . Henn & ". Alexander, Laws 
of Corporations, 628 . 3<i ed.. 1983 The corporate 
opportunity doctrine, however, also ••;,:•: .,-ges upon the 
fiduciaries 1 preparing to compete, making inquiries, 
and gathering information. These activities may be 
tainted by the fiduciaries' ultimate action of starting 
a. competing business av-i thus t;>- ioctrir.e exercises a 
• h I.1.1 i na effect o n t h em . 
Ibid 
I e s t^ne individuals 1 legitimate 
rights 
..<=• ; iduc iary-cc rporat e r~ ia t lonsnip is more 
;r.ai:gcus t: an agency oioyee, or partnership 
relationship in which both pities have recognized the 
juries and rights of tne other and such rights and 
duties are flexibly negotiated When the corporation 
and the fiduciaries enter into their relationship, they 
are concerned about protecting the;:1 :wn interests o :** 
acknowledge the existence and importance of the other 
party's interests, '-^-; ther party can afford to under-
estimate the other i ;argaining position. Individuals 
*v o are being considered for director; officer, or key 
employee positions possess attributes such as experi-
-•V :e talents, or economic resources chat are higniy 
:\-,i*ueo oy the corporation, viese individuals also are 
likely to have other options in wnich to invest their 
>ou;:es or talents. The corporation likewise has 
- tributes such as institutional resources and status 
that are attractive T * prospective •' id u " inr ; *>• • 
ik.4^ • **7-44o. vc^aorp omittea ) She recognizer th*a*" en 
increasing number o. - ' tu cne corporate 
opportunity doctrine; 
To begin, the number of situations implicating the 
corporate opportunity doctrine is increasing. Busi-
nesses are becoming more diversified and, consequently, 
the opportunities in which they may have some interest, 
expectancy, or capability are increasing. Meanwhile, 
fiduciaries are becoming increasingly well educated; 
they are multifaceted individuals who are exposed to 
and interested in diverse ideas and opportunities. The 
proliferation of professional meetings, journals for 
every conceivable professional specialty, and tele-
communication systems allowing an extensive and 
instantaneous horizon of contacts and ideas enhance 
innovative thinking and the generation of entrepreneur-
ial ideas. Finally, the fast pace of technological 
development and the increasing concern with industrial 
productivity provide fertile ground for more opportuni-
ties. 
(V)arious courts have found key employees 
[See Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 
425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980); Wilmington Trust Co. v. 
Consistent Asset Management Co., No. 8867 (Del. Ch. 
March 25, 1987) (LEXIS, States Library, Omni file); 
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 
564 (1978)] and majority shareholders subject to the 
doctrine. Several cases decided in Georgia illustrate 
the difficulty of these issues. In determining whether 
a chief engineer was subject to the state's business 
opportunity statute, the supreme court concluded that 
the law was applicable to directors and officers but 
not to "typical employees." It implied, however, that 
individuals other than directors and officers might be 
subject to the law if they were in fiduciary positions. 
The court did not elaborate on what constituted 
fiduciary status. A later Georgia case held that the 
statute should be read literally to apply only to 
directors and officers. The holding, however, was 
expansive in its application. A vice-president of 
sales, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was 
presumed to be an "officer" and hence subject to the 
statute. 
Ibid . , pp. 449-450. (Footnotes omitted.) She points out 
problems that will arise as the corporate opportunity doctrine is 
extended to nontraditional fiduciaries: 
The extension of the corporate opportunity 
doctrine to nontraditional fiduciaries raises several 
issues. First, courts are more likely to conclude that 
key employees are subject to the doctrine and its 
6 
resrr;::.:;:.:- ; \ tose employees hav-> Dee. endowed wi*~h 
more trust and responsibility (as sugge^'ed by access 
to confidential information and increased authority"! 
and have invested significantly in the corporation -as 
suggested by thriv years with the corporation and an 
equity interest). Given this judicial propensity and a 
desire to avoid restrictions on their activities. 
employees may be hesitant accept more trustworthy 
positions or to increase their corporate commitment. 
This result seems contrary to policy interests, which 
would be better served ; f Individuals were rewarded 
rather than penalized for their •.••creasing ccrpcr-. "e 
r .") 1 es and resocns i b i 1 i +"": °^ 
S e c o n d -: e e v o iv ing d i s t i n c t i o n oetweei: ^-x 
employees who are considered fiduciaries and those who 
are not creates uncertainty for Individuals with major 
corporate responsibilities. Many o: these individuals 
are no doubt unaware that they may be subject to the 
corporate opportunity doctrine. "J;^J lack of notice _s 
especially significant because or the disparity between 
the standard of conduct for nonf iduciaries and the 
standard for fiduciaries. In iignt of the potential 
consequences for key employees, corporations arguably 
should nave a duty to it. term those employees when the 
corporation considers them to be fiduciaries subject to 
the corporate opportunity doctrine. 
Ibid . n . .* .. ; 11ni.i t f"ed 
? r o f e - s .:• r C b e e m p h a s i z e s f V ? i m p o r t a n c e o t •. i - l . i 1 
••;*:• — :•••• as t h e S ' r c e s s f ' i i d e v e l o p m e n t of o p p o r -
t u n i t i e s a n u t h e d e v e l o p m e n t ^ . e.. ;• - . • - - ^ r n ' R s . 
Trad i_t i cna 1 T e s t s 
V : K- ^ - -!'*:*---r a , f p < . t s t t a : h a v e ~ecrH 
e m p l D y e d by * . ~ c - . . / , , ^
 fc : - a 
citations ^; * id'K nrie^ a- 'f'lries snouui e-e , na analysis 
; :; summarized -s >-»e discusses 
the ructrlnal confusion m a t appears ... x^w^u^a ^^c*i: 
Some ...... -. Isarlv . * rugcling with the 
inadequacies - • the traditional tests. Some cases 
reflect an ambiv * I en t. sometimes incomprehensi b i e 
approach * ^m:---: ^-^rtunity problems. The courts 
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TABLE 1 
TRADITIONAL TESTS: 
CORPORATE INTEREST AS EXCLUSIVE CONCERN 
Test 
Line of 
Business Test 
Key Inquiries 
Is the opportunity in com-
petition with corporation? 
Is the opportunity one to 
which the corporation 
could possible adapt its 
resources? 
Consequences 
If yes, the fiduci-
aries are precluded 
from pursuing the 
opportunity. 
Expectancy 
Test 
Fairness Test 
Miller Test 
Does the corporation have 
a contractual claim to the 
opportunity? 
Would it be unfair to the 
corporation for the fiduc-
iaries to pursue the 
opportunity? 
Is the opportunity in the 
corporation's line of 
business? If so, would 
it be unfair to the cor-
poration for the fiduci-
aries to pursue the oppor-
tunity? (Combination of 
line of business test and 
fairness test.) 
If yes, the fiduci-
aries are precluded 
from pursuing the 
opportunity. 
If yes, the fiduci-
aries are precluded 
from pursuing the 
opportunity. 
If both in the line 
of business and un-
fair, the fiduci-
aries are precluded 
from the oppor-
tunity. 
8 
cite traditional tests in an almost perfunctory way, 
but the test on which they actually rely is sometimes 
unrecognizable as the traditional tests cited. Because 
the traditional tests and the eventual results are not 
consistent, these courts often cannot provide logical, 
well-reasoned explanations for the results. They 
instead follow the routine of elaborately stating the 
facts, citing the tests, and announcing their conclu-
sion. Unfortunately, the analytical step of explaining 
how the legal principles are applied to the facts to 
reach the indicated legal conclusion often is missing. 
Ibid., pp. 465-466. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Emerging Corporate Opportunity Models 
Professor Chew identifies three emerging models: (2) the 
corporate capability model, (2) the corporate expectations model, 
and (3) the disclosure model. Those models are summarized in 
Table 2 on the following page. Each model is reviewed in detail 
for its strengths and weaknesses. Professor Chew notes: 
. While the models have noteworthy benefits, 
they all have one fundamental shortcoming. The models 
focus exclusively on protecting the interests of the 
corporation; they do not acknowledge competing societal 
and individual interests. 
Ibid., p. 469. (Footnote omitted.) 
The Reasonable Expectations Test 
Finally, Professor Chew explores an alternative to the 
traditional tests: the reasonable expectations test. Under this 
alternative, courts would resolve corporate opportunity disputes 
according to the expectations of the parties, as depicted in 
Table 3. 
This approach i s in cont ras t to the t r a d i t i o n a l 
approach , which bases l i a b i l i t y on the defendants1 
f i d u c i a r y s t a t u s and the pro tec t ion of the corporate 
i n t e r e s t . This p roposa l a l s o d i f f e r s from o the r 
e x p e c t a t i o n - r e l a t e d approaches . Those approaches 
misconstrue the corpora te- f iduciary r e l a t i onsh ip and 
9 
TABLE 2 
EMERGING CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY MODELS 
Model Key Inquiries Consequences 
Corporate 
Capability 
Model 
Was the corporation able 
(financially, legally, 
practically) to pursue 
the opportunity? 
If not, then the fidu-
ciaries probably would 
not be precluded from 
the opportunity. 
Corporate 
Expecta-
tions Model 
Is the opportunity with-
in the corporation's 
reasonable expectations? 
If so, then the fiduci-
aries are precluded 
from the opportunity. 
Disclosure 
Model 
Did the fiduciaries dis-
close the opportunity 
and the corporation 
consent to the fiduci-
aries1 taking of it? 
If not, then the fiduc-
iaries are precluded 
from the opportunity. 
10 
TABLE 3 
PARTIES1 REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
Follow 
Expectations of 
Corporation 
Corporation is likely 
to negotiate terms 
that protect the 
integrity of the 
corporate-fiduciary 
relationship and its 
competitive position. 
Expectations of 
Fiduciaries 
Fiduciaries are likely 
to negotiate terms 
that protect their 
rights to compete 
and to start new 
businesses. 
Fiduciaries' 
interests 
coincide with 
societal 
interests in 
promoting com-
petition and 
entrepreneur-
ship . 
Determination of Specific Expectations 
1. Context of overall relationship. 
2. Principles in Maryland Metals. 
3. Express agreement• 
11 
how corporations operate. Furthermore, they consider 
the corporations interest predominant. 
Ibid. , pp. 491-492. She urges courts to begin with an under-
standing of the basic relationships between the corporation and 
fiduciaries. 
• . . The corporate-fiduciary relationship is more 
analogous to an agency, employee, or partnership 
relationship where the duties and rights of both 
parties are recognized and flexibly negotiated. The 
courts should respect their understanding. 
Ibid., P. 493. (Footnote omitted.) 
Developing Case Law 
Professor Chew refers to Science Accessories Corp. v. 
Summagraphics, 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980), as one of the excep-
tional cases where a court took the bold step of explicitly 
recognizing competing corporate and non-corporate interests in a 
corporate opportunity dispute. 
In Science Accessories, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed 
whether three employees had breached their fiduciary duties to 
their corporate employer. One employee was a nuclear physicist 
in charge of the research and development and engineering 
departments. One was chief engineer, and the third was super-
visor of manufacturing. None were corporate officers or direc-
tors at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, which involved 
diverting a technological concept to the new corporation they 
formed. The Delaware court pointed out the duties a key mana-
gerial employee owes his corporate employer: 
It is true, of course, that under elemental 
principles of agency law, an agent owes his principal a 
duty of good faith, loyalty and fair dealing. 3 CJS 
12 
Agency § 271; Restatement (Second of Agency, § 387 
(1957). Encompassed within such general duties of an 
agent is a duty to disclose information that is 
relevant to the affairs of the agency entrusted to him. 
There is also a corollary duty of an agent not to put 
himself in a position antagonistic to his principal 
concerning the subject matter of his agency. Restate-
ment (Second of Agency §§ 381 and 393 (1957). 
However, agency law is not without its limitations 
as to both duty to disclose and duty not to act 
adversely to a principal's business. Thus, an agent is 
not under a duty to disclose to his principal informa-
tion obtained in confidence, the disclosure of which 
would be a breach of duty to a third person. Restate-
ment Second) of Agency § 381, Comment e (1957); see 
also § 393, Comment c (1957). 
Similarly, while an agent may not put himself in a 
position antagonistic to his principal, an agent is not 
thereby prevented from acting in good faith outside his 
employment even though it may adversely affect his 
principal's business. Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 387, Comment b (1957). Further, an agent can make 
arrangements or plans to go into competition with his 
principal before terminating his agency, provided no 
unfair acts are committed or injury done his principal. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 303, Comment e (1957). 
A.2d at p. 962. 
The court identified the competing policy interests: 
These principles and limitations of agency law 
carry over into the field of corporate employment so as 
to apply not only to officers and directors but also to 
key managerial personnel. See Cahall v. Lofland, 
Del.Ch., 114 A. 224 (1921); 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia 
Corporations (Perm.Ed.1975) § 846. They reflect 
competing policy interests in the law as to employer-
employee relationships. On the one hand there is ff. . 
. concern for the integrity of the employment relation-
ship [which] has led courts to establish a rule that 
demands of a corporate officer or employee an undivided 
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation." Maryland 
Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, Md.App., 382 A.2d 568 (1978), 
citing Guth v. Loft, Inc. , Del.Supr., 5 A.2d 503 
(1939). However, there is an off-setting policy 
"recognized by the courts . . . of safeguarding 
society's interest in fostering free and vigorous 
competition in the economics sphere . . . This policy 
in favor of free competition has prompted the recogni-
13 
tion of a privilege in favor of employees which enables 
them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with 
their employers prior to leaving the employ of their 
prospective rivals without fear of incurring liability 
for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty. " 
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, supra, at 569. 
The doctrine of corporate opportunity represents 
one aspect of the law's effort to reconcile these 
competing policy interests. Guth v.^Loft, Inc./ supra. 
3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm.Ed.1975) 
§ 861.1. See General Automotive Manufacturing Company 
v. Singer, Wis.Supr., 120 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1963) 
stating, "The doctrine of corporate opportunity is a 
species of the duty of a fiduciary to act with undi-
vided loyalty." Thus, the law of corporate opportunity 
is clearly pertinent, if not decisive, to the issue of 
whether defendants breached any fiduciary duty owed SAC 
in their handling of the magwire digitizer concept 
while in SAC's employ. And SAC so argued below. 
Ibid., pp. 962-963. 
The court summarized the law regarding a key manageri 
employee's fiduciary duty to his corporate employer when 
business opportunity is presented: 
Briefly summarized, the law is that if a business 
opportunity is presented to a corporate executive, the 
officer cannot seize the opportunity for himself if: 
(a) the corporation is financially able to undertake 
it; (b) it is within the corporation's line of busi-
ness; (c) the corporation is interested in the oppor-
tunity. Guth v. Loft, Inc., supra, and Johnston v. 
Greene, Del.Supr., 121 A.2d 919 (1956). However, as 
stated in Eguity Corporation v. Milton, Del. Supr., 
221, A.2d 494 at 497 (1966): 
A corollary of the Guth rule is that when a 
business opportunity comes to a corporate 
officer, which, because of the nature of the 
opportunity, is not one which is essential or 
desirable for his corporation to embrace, 
being an opportunity in which it has no 
actual or expectant interest, the officer is 
entitled to treat the business opportunity as 
his own and the corporation has no interest 
in it, provided the officer has not wrong-
fully embarked the corporation's resources in 
order to acquire the business opportunity. 
14 
Ibid., p. 963. 
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
finding that the concept in Science Accessories was not an 
opportunity available to the corporate employer, which was in 
poor financial condition. That ended the -inquiry. 
The question then becomes whether the Court's 
finding that Brenner's concept was not a corporate 
opportunity available to SAC ends the inquiry as to 
whether defendants fulfilled their fiduciary duty to 
SAC of disclosure and not to divert an opportunity to 
themselves. We think so, for this reason. The gist of 
SAC's claim that defendants had breached their fiduci-
ary duty to SAC was that the breach occurred as a 
result of the defendants' acts of secreting and then 
diverting Brenner's magwire concept from SAC to 
themselves. That raised a clear corporate opportunity 
issue which the Trial Court found to be the dominant 
issue before it at time of trial. With that issue 
having been resolved by the Court against SAC based on 
express fin-dings of fact that are not directly con-
tested, SAC cannot now persuasively argue that the 
Trial Court's findings as to corporate opportunity are 
not also dispositive of the question of whether 
defendants breached their above-mentioned fiduciary 
duties to SAC. For the law of corporate opportunity 
sets the parameters of permissible employee conduct 
consistent with an employee's fiduciary duties to his 
employers of loyalty and fair dealing. 
Ibid., pp. 963-964. (Footnote omitted.) The court observed: 
Thus, the doctrine of corporate opportunity is but 
application of agency fiduciary law in a particular 
corporate fact setting. 
Ibid., p. 964. 
The Delaware Court did analyze the employees' conduct in 
light of the corporate employer's failure to prove their conduct 
caused it to suffer any actual damages. The court quoted 
language from Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564 (Md. 
App. 1978): 
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The right to make arrangements to compete is by no 
means absolute and the exercise of the privilege may, 
in appropriate circumstances, rise to the level of a 
breach of an employee's fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
. . . (T)he ultimate determination of whether an 
employee has breached his fiduciary duties to his 
employer by preparing to engage in a competing enter-
prise must be grounded upon a thoroughgoing examination 
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
382 A.2d at 569, 570. 
Ibid., p. 965. 
DISCUSSION 
This case follows the typical fact pattern Professor Chew 
identifies. Williams and Rockwood identified, investigated, 
negotiated, decided to pursue, and made preliminary plans to 
pursue the KSL opportunity. They were discovered and fired. 
They then actively began their competing business and developed 
the KSL account into a profitable venture. Williams and Rockwood 
had not signed any non-competition agreement with Gillham. 
Williams and Rockwood occupied positions of trust and met 
the criteria by which Professor Chew identifies a fiduciary. 
Williams and Rockwood assert they were merely "employees at will" 
and "although each were given 'Vice-President' titles, neither 
were ever corporate officers." 
Whether Williams and Rockwood were key employees or ordinary 
employees was a factual issue before the trial court which 
precluded summary judgment. Resolution of that factual issue was 
essential to determine the duties Williams and Rockwood owed 
their corporate employer, Gillham. If key employees, they owed 
Gillham (1) a duty of good faith, loyalty, and fair dealing; (2) 
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a duty to disclose information relevant to the affairs of the 
agency entrusted to them; and (3) a duty not to put themselves in 
a position antagonistic to the affairs of the agency entrusted to 
them. If ordinary employees, their duty was only to render loyal 
and conscientious service during regularly scheduled hours. 
Williams and Rockwood clearly diverted the lucrative KSL 
account to their new corporation. [Brief of Appellant, Contro-
verted Fact No. 2; Gillham Pacts #23, #66, #71, #77, #78; pp. 8, 
19, 20, 21-22.] The KSL account was clearly an affair of the 
agency entrusted to them. 
Their chief defense is that they developed their plan "on 
their own time." [Brief of the Respondents, p. 3.] Secondly, 
they argue that adapting Gillham forms to their own use did not 
constitute misuse of "Gillham business information." [R. 083, <|f 
21, R. 109-110.] Williams and Rockwood conveniently gloss over 
these facts: 
1. Five of their corporation's six full-time employees 
were former Gillham employees (presumably with knowledge 
necessary to service Gillham's KSL account). [Brief of 
Appellant, Controverted Fact No. 2, Gillham Fact #78, p. 
21.] 
2. Prior to their termination, they prepared a budget 
(presumably derived from Gillham financial information) to 
submit to KSL for their new advertising agency take-over of 
the KSL account [#49, p. 16]. 
3. Prior to their termination, they held a number of 
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closed-door meetings (presumably to plan the business of 
their new advertising agency's business with KSL and others\ 
in Williams' office [#43, p. 14]. 
4. Prior to their termination, they explored with 
Gillham employees the possibility o f working for their new 
corporation [#36, p. 11; #40, p.l2]. 
The particular information and employees necessary to 
service the KSL account was certainly "Gillham business informa-
tion" which Williams and Rockwood had an affirmative agency duty 
not to misuse to Gillham1s detriment. Williams and Rockwood do 
not argue that Gillham was not injured by the loss of the 
$200,000 KSL account. 
KSL had been Gillham's client for 10 or 12 years [R. 179, <lfs 
10-11 j. Williams and Rockwood had no right to seize KSL for 
themselves. Gillham was financially able to service the KSL 
account; there was no evidence to the contrary. The KSL account 
was certainly within Gillham's line of business. Gillham was 
undisputedly interested in continuing to service the KSL account. 
Williams' and Rockwood's conduct in seizing the KSL account 
was clearly not within the parameters of permissible employee 
conduct consistent with their fiduciary duties as key employees. 
While key employees at Gillham, they breached their duty of good 
faith, loyalty, and fair dealing to Gillham. They did not 
disclose to Gillham KSL's willingness to go with any new agency 
they might form. They put themselves in a position antagonistic 
to KSL continuing as a Gillham account. 
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Genuine issues of material fact precluded the trial court 
from granting summary judgment in favor of Williams and Rockwood, 
particularly the issue of whether Williams and Rockwood were "key 
employees'1 or merely "ordinary employees." This Court should 
reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment and the award 
of judgment and costs that followed thereupon. 
POINT II 
USE OF GILLHAM'S KSL BUSINESS INFORMATION AGAINST 
GILLHAM IN VIOLATION OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS KEY 
EMPLOYEES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD. 
Williams and Rockwood argue that because Gillham did not 
file affidavits in response to their Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the trial court's award of summary judgment was proper. Williams 
and Rockwood misconstrue Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 56(e) provides, in pertinent part: 
. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
Gillham's response [R. 176-197] identified controverted 
facts and set forth specific supplemental facts supporting 
controversy. Those supplemental facts were all supported by 
reference to the depositions which had been taken in the matter. 
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Gillham's response was clearly in accordance with Rule 
56(e). The supplemental facts clearly supported Gillham's 
contention that Williams and Rockwood, as key employees, breached 
their fiduciary duties to Gillham. See also, , Christensen ex 
rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 
1010 (1963); and Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). 
Misuse of Gillham Business Information 
Williams and Rockwood argue that adapting Gillham forms to 
their own use did not constitute misuse of "Gillham business 
information." [R. 083, 1 21, R. 109-110.] Williams and Rockwood 
take a shallow view of the "Gillham business information" they 
diverted to their own corporation. As demonstrated in Point I 
above, five of their corporation's six full-time employees were 
former Gillham employees, presumably with knowledge necessary to 
service Gillham's KSL account. The budget they submitted to KSL 
for their takeover of the KSL account had to have been derived 
from Gillham financial information. They held a number of 
closed-door meetings in Williams' office (on Gillham premises, 
presumably during regular business hours and presumably to plan 
their new agency's business with KSL and others). They explored 
with Gillham employees the possibility of working for their new 
corporation. 
The details of the KSL account cannot be said to have been 
generally known or available. As trusted employees, Williams and 
rockwood knew those details, however, and used those details to 
seize the KSL account from Gillham in breach of their fiduciary 
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duties regarding their business conduct in the use of the Gillham 
business and conducting themselves in a manner to benefit 
themselves individually and the business entity of Williams and 
Rockwood. [R. 006, <f 20.] 
They used "Gillham business information" antagonistically 
against Gillham and to benefit themselves. The information they 
used was more than forms, and they know it. 
Summary judgment was not appropriate and was improperly 
granted. This Court should reverse the trial court's award. 
CONCLUSION 
The genuine issue of whether Williams and Rockwood were "key 
employees" or merely "ordinary employees" precluded summary 
judgment in this case. If "key employees," under developing case 
law Williams and Rockwood breached their fiduciary duties to 
Gillham of (1) good faith, loyalty, and fair dealing; (2) to 
disclose information relevant to the affairs of the agency 
entrusted to them; and (3) not to put themselves in a position 
antagonistic to the affairs of the agency entrusted to them. 
While employed at Gillham, Williams and Rockwood clearly made 
preparations to divert the KSL account to the new agency they 
were forming. The KSL account was a business opportunity they 
had no right to seize. Gillham was financially able to service 
the KSL account. The KSL account was clearly within Gillham1s 
line of business. Gillham was undisputedly interested in 
continuing to service the KSL account. 
Summary judgment was inappropriate and improperly granted. 
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Williams and Rockwood misused more Gillham information than mere 
forms. This Court should reverse and remand this matter for 
trial. 
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